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Abstract 
 
Sovereign powers are not absolute but exercised in varying areas and to varying degrees by 
sub-state, state and supra-state entities. The upward dispersion of power to international 
organisations carries implications for the sub-state level, while sub-state governance poses 
demands as to the conduct of governance at the international level. It is well recognised that 
sub-state entities, such as federal states and autonomies, may have the (restricted) capacity 
to enter into international relations. But what capacities do international organisations have 
to accommodate autonomies in their institutional frameworks? This paper shall present a case 
study of one such framework, namely Nordic co-operation and the accommodation of the 
Nordic autonomies, the Faroe Islands, Greenland and Åland, within its institutional 
framework. Within ‘Norden’, the position of autonomies has been scrutinised and adapted on 
several occasions, in the late 1960s, early 1980s and in the mid-2000s. The accommodation of 
the autonomies has been discussed in light of evident implications of statehood and 
international legal personality and the institutional arrangements eventually carved serve well 
to illustrate the challenges and opportunities international organisations face in the attempt 
to accommodate multi-level systems.  
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Making Autonomies Matter:  
Sub-State Actor Accommodation in the Nordic 
Council and the Nordic Council of Ministers  
Sarah Stephan 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Most, if not all, items on the agendas of today’s law and policy-makers have 
international, national and regional dimensions. This necessitates governance 
across multiple levels, both within and beyond state borders. Sovereign 
powers are not absolute but exercised in varying areas and to varying degrees 
by sub-state, state and supra-state entities.1 Of course, in today’s globalised 
and interdependent world, almost all areas of life are indeed objects of 
international agreements and are regulated to varying extents by 
international bodies. Certainly, the upward dispersion of powers to 
international organisations carries implications for the sub-state level. As law-
makers and regulatory bodies, international organisations impact the life of 
states but also of sub-state entities, such as federal units or autonomies. 
What is often overlooked, however, is that sub-state governance also poses 
demands as to the conduct of governance at the international level. 
International law pays only little attention to sub-state arrangements. Sub-
state entities are regularly presented as objects rather than subjects. It is 
mainly where a particular sub-state arrangement is entrenched also 
internationally, for instance as a solution to territorial or ethno-political 
conflict, that internal self-government experiences some form of 
international legal endorsement and is studied from the perspective of 
international law. This holds true for autonomies in particular.2  
At the same time, it is well recognised that sub-state entities may have the 
(restricted) capacity to enter into international relations. As expressed aptly 
by the Government of the Faroe Islands “[i]t makes no sense to have internal 
policy competence in an area for which there is not also the equivalent 
foreign policy competence, especially as globalisation means that national 
law becomes increasingly subordinate to international law.”3 Here, the 
 
 
1  See Ruth Lapidoth, Autonomy: flexible solutions to ethnic conflicts (United States Institute of 
Peace Press, Washington D.C., 1997), 46 et seq; Markku Suksi, Sub-State Governance through 
Territorial Autonomy. A Comparative Study in Constitutional Law of Powers, Procedures and 
Institutions” (Springer, Heidelberg, Berlin, 2011), 3.  
2  Such research has largely concentrated on autonomy, cf. e.g. Hurst Hannum, Autonomy, 
Sovereignty and Self-Determination – The Accommodation of Conflicting Rights (University of 
Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 1996); Lapidoth, Autonomy…; Zelim A. Skurbaty, Beyond the One-
Dimensional State: An Emerging Right to Autonomy? (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden, 2005).  
3  General comment to the Faroese Act No. 80 of 14 May 2005 on the Conclusion of Agreements under 
International Law by the Government of the Faroes, see webpage of the Prime Minister’s Office. 
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internal distribution of powers within a state is decisive and defines the 
extent of a sub-state entity’s external competences. It is from the 
perspective of constitutional and comparative law that such competences are 
studied in order to better understand and systematize the particularities of 
such domestic arrangements.4 However, international relations, whether 
exercised by sovereign states or sub-state entities, are always relational in 
essence. When sub-state entities, sovereign states and international 
organisations meet on the international plane, the international law 
dimensions of, for example, territorial autonomy, become evident. 
International law might still be preoccupied with, but is no longer limited to, 
an international community of states. International organisations, 
international corporations and, of course, individuals, have received 
increasing attention as the bearers of rights and duties under international 
law.5 Likewise, autonomies can be considered as subjects of specific 
international frameworks. In fact, instead of subjects we speak increasingly 
of actors and actor capacity.6 Contrary to common perception, autonomy is 
not an exception and we find numerous autonomy arrangements around the 
world.7 It is desirable that forms of shared sovereignty and territorial self-
government are discussed, also from the perspective of international 
 
 
Cabinet Office and Foreign Service of the Faroe Islands, http://www.mfa.fo/Default.aspx?ID=11725, 
last visited 6 October 2013.  
4  As Malcolm Shaw has noted in his widely read textbook on international law with regard to federal 
states, “[t]he federal state will itself, of course, have personality, but the question of the 
personality and capability of the component units of the federation on the international plane can 
only really be determined in the light of the constitution of the state concerned and state practice. 
Shaw thus suggests that the above questions can be disentangled with reference to constitutional 
law, see Malcolm N Shaw, International Law (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 5th ed. 2003), 
196. A more in-depth contribution on this issue has been made in the early 1970s by Ivan Bernier 
with a work on the international legal aspects of federalism, see Ivan Bernier, International Legal 
Aspects of Federalism (Longman Group Limited, London, 1973). Bernier’s more diverse account 
reveals the conceptual complexities behind the international legal problems traditionally associated 
with federal states, namely those of personality, responsibility and immunity. Certainly, these apply 
also to other forms of internal self-government such as territorial autonomy, possibility even more 
so considering that territorial autonomy arrangements often lack supremacy clauses that function to 
legitimize internally their representation by the state on the international level. Similar 
complexities might moreover be revealed within supranational systems such as the EU, which 
exposes increasing similarities to a federal state; Chris N. Okeke has in the mid-70s studied a 
number of entities with limited sovereignty and their international capacity, see Chris N. Okeke, 
Controversial Subjects of Contemporary International Law (Rotterdam University Press, Rotterdam, 
1974). 
5  See the International Court of Justice’s landmark advisory opinion in Reparations for Injuries 
Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, 1949 ICJ Reports 174. 
6  Roland Portland, Legal Personality in International Law (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
2010), 208 et seqq. 
7  The term autonomy is used differently by different scholars, for a broad overview of possible 
conceptualizations see Michael Tkacik, “The Characteristics of Forms of Autonomy”, 4 International 
Journal on Minority and Group Rights (2008), 369–401.  
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institutional law and under the auspices of international organisations in 
order to do justice to existing multi-level arrangements. 8 
How do international legal frameworks regulate the co-operation between 
dissimilar state entities with ‘actor capacity’? Considering the dispositive 
character and fragmented nature of international law, the answers will be 
highly contextual and depend on the international legal-institutional 
framework in question. The question is rather what capacities individual 
international organisations have to accommodate autonomies institutionally.  
This article shall present a case study of one such framework, namely 
Nordic co-operation and the accommodation of the three Nordic autonomies 
within the Nordic Council (Council) and Nordic Council of Ministers (Council of 
Ministers). I depart from the presumption that legislative, executive and 
judicative functions are indeed dispersed across the ‘sub’, the state, and the 
‘supra’ in today’s globalised and interdependent world and set out to explore 
the development of sub-state actor accommodation within the Nordic Council 
and Council of Ministers and its current modalities. How are the Nordic 
autonomies, the Åland Islands, Greenland and the Faroe Islands 
accommodated within the institutional framework for Nordic co-operation? 
Which rights and duties are accorded to the autonomies? This case study shall 
serve to illustrate the capacities of international organisations to pay regard 
to multiple levels of governance and to create institutional frameworks for 
the accommodation of autonomies. I map the stages in which the autonomies 
have successively gained representation in the Nordic Council and access to 
the Council of Ministers at the end of the 1960s, early 1980s and mid-2000s 
and discuss the scope and limits of the current system.9  
The three Nordic autonomies are well comparable for the purposes of the 
present article. They do not only share some of the geographical 
particularities that shape island regions; they are also home to three 
 
 
8  The fact that autonomies may attain membership of international organisations is often 
acknowledged; however, research thus far has not further dealt with the modalities of such 
accommodation, see e.g. Hannum, Autonomy, Sovereignty and Self-Determination…, 23; Suksi, Sub-
State Governance through Territorial Autonomy…, 575 et seqq. Deeper examinations focus on the 
legal personality of minorities and indigenous people under international law, mainly in relation to 
human rights law, their capacity to bring claims before international tribunals, but less on their 
position within non-judicial fora, see e.g. Anna Meijknecht, Towards International Personality: The 
Position of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples in International Law (Intersentia, Oxford, 2001).Of 
course, in this contexts the individual versus collective dimension is a concern that does not apply 
to autonomies or sub-state actors in general. Only one study by Sia Spiliopoulou Åkermark has 
focused on the position of autonomies before international tribunals, see Sia Spiliopoulou Åkermark, 
“The Procedural Position of Autonomous Regions Before International Judicial and Quasi-Judicial 
Organs”, in Markku Suksi (ed.), Autonomy: Applications and Implications (Kluwer Law International, 
The Hague, 1998); 139-150. 
9  Among the Nordic autonomies, I focus on the Åland Islands, not because they make an exceptional 
case, in fact, all three autonomies are accorded equal status within the institutions of Nordic co-
operation. The spotlight is on an international body rather than on individual autonomy regimes: 
however, where reference to internal frameworks is necessary I chose to focus on the Åland Islands 
simply because they are the case study I am most familiar with. 
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linguistic minorities, which are distinct from the majority populations 
inhabiting the mainland states to which they belong, in terms of language, 
culture and history. Autonomy has been chosen as the appropriate form of 
minority governance in the case of all three Nordic autonomies and has 
acquired, through these living and rather well-functioning examples, a 
certain permanence and acceptance in the Nordic context as a valid 
instrument for accommodating autochthonous minorities. This is not to say 
there are no problems and that the Nordic countries do not struggle with 
accommodating other minorities in satisfying ways. Nonetheless, autonomy is 
very much a Nordic tradition. 
The fact that the Åland Islands, Greenland and the Faroe Islands occupy 
institutionalised positions within Nordic co-operation is all the more 
interesting in view of the fact that Nordic integration is currently 
experiencing a revived interest, as manifested in Gunnar Wetterberg’s 
proposal for the creation of a Nordic federation and Johan Strang’s report 
proposing a less synchronised pace of integration within what he calls “Nordic 
communities”.10 Autonomy and minority protection are thereby situated 
within a lively and highly topical Nordic integration debate.11   
 
2. The Status Quo: The Position of the Autonomies in the 
Institutional Framework for Nordic Co-operation 
The Nordic Council and the Nordic Council of Ministers are the political bodies 
governing the co-operation between the Nordic countries (Denmark, Norway, 
Sweden, Finland, Iceland), and the three autonomous, or self-governing 
territories (the Åland Islands in Finland as well as Greenland and the Faroe 
Islands in Denmark).12 Nordic co-operation is governed today by the Helsinki 
Treaty of 1962, but existed prior to that since 1952 by virtue of individual 
national acts and simple rules of procedure.13 The Helsinki Treaty is an 
international agreement between the five Nordic countries, which are the 
High Contracting Parties and thus the Member States of ‘Norden’, as the 
overall institution is called.  
At first, the focus of Nordic co-operation lay on inter-parliamentary co-
operation within the Nordic Council. Nonetheless, Nordic co-operation has 
never been entirely inter-parliamentary as government representatives 
 
 
10 Gunnar Wetterberg, “The United Nordic Federation”, TemaNord 2010:583, Nordic Council of 
Ministers, Copenhagen, 2010, also available on the webpage of Norden, at 
http://www.norden.org/en/publications/publikationer/2010-583, last accessed 21 October 2013; 
Johan Strang, “Nordiska Gemenskaper. En vision för samarbetet”, Nord 2012:009, Nordic Council, 
Copenhagen, 2012, available (in Swedish only) on the webpage of Norden, at http://www.pohjola-
norden.fi/filebank/3160-strang_se.pdf, last accessed 21 October 2013. 
11  Sia Spiliopoulou Åkermark (ed.), The Åland Example and its Components – Relevance for 
International Conflict Resolution (The Åland Islands Peace Institute, Mariehamn, 2011), 11. 
12  The terms autonomous and self-governing are used interchangeably throughout this article. 
13  Frantz Wendt, Cooperation in the Nordic Countries (Almqvist & Wiksell International, Stockholm, 
1981) 35; Finland considered itself in the position to join first in 1956, ibid, 36.  
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participated and continue to participate in the Council’s meetings, without 
voting rights or decision-making capacity but with a right of initiative. The 
Nordic Council of Ministers, the inter-governmental decision-making body, 
was established first in 1971. Today, Norden encompasses both an inter-
parliamentary and an inter-governmental tier. The fundamental difference 
between the Nordic Council and the Nordic Council of Ministers is the fact 
that the Nordic Council makes no binding decisions. It acts largely as an 
advisory body to the Council of Ministers and both tiers of governance are 
closely integrated and have extensive mutual reporting obligations.14  The 
Nordic Council may, for instance, propose changes to the priorities made in 
the financial framework set out by the Council of Ministers, which the latter 
is to comply with unless there are extreme circumstances not to do so.15 
Thus, it could be argued that the Nordic Council is, in fact, exercising a 
certain degree of parliamentary control over the Council of Ministers. 
Decision-making in the Council of Ministers is unanimous but it has been 
noted that voting in the Nordic Council of Ministers takes place very rarely 
and that the Ministers and their staff in the committees work towards 
consensus.16  
Nordic co-operation is broad and encompasses legal, cultural, social and 
economic co-operation, co-operation on transport and communications and 
co-operation in the area of environmental protection.17 Interestingly, the 
Helsinki Treaty explicitly mentions that participation by the High Contracting 
Parties in European and other international forms of co-operation provides 
excellent opportunities for collaboration for the benefit of Nordic citizens 
and companies, and that the Governments bear a particular responsibility in 
this regard to safeguard common interests and values.18 Nordic co-operation 
thus has a clearly spelled out external dimension or ambition. Co-operation 
with the Baltic Sea neighbours, within the Artic area and with the European 
Union (EU) are prioritised.19 It has been noted that Sweden, Denmark and 
Finland who are not only members of Norden but also of the EU have 
supported the ‘Nordic dimension’ within the EU and are indeed perceived as a 
“special block of Europe”.20 In fact, the creation of the EU and its subsequent 
 
 
14  Ibid. 81. 
15  Cf. Art. 64 Treaty of Co-operation between Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden of 1962 
(Helsinki Treaty). 
16  Fridtjov Clement, “Helsingforsavtalen og de selvstyrte områdene”, Bilaga 3, Nordiska ministerrådet, 
De självstyrda områdena och det nordiska samarbetet. Generalsekreterarens kartläggning, ANP 
2006:743, Copenhagen, 2006, 37.  
17  Cf. Arts. 8-32 Helsinki Treaty. 
18  Cf. Art. 33 Helsinki Treaty. 
19 Webpage of Norden, The Nordic Council of Ministers, About International Co-operation, at 
http://www.norden.org/en/nordic-council-of-ministers/international-co-operation, last visited 25 
September 2013. 
20  Søren Dosenrode, “Introduction: The Nordic Regions and the European Union”, in Søren Dosenrode 
and Henrik Halkier (eds.), The Nordic Regions and the European Unions (Ashgate, Burlington, 2004), 
1. 
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development have decisively shaped Nordic co-operation.21 Certainly, the 
Council and the Council of Minister fulfil an important liaising function in this 
respect also with regard to Norway and Iceland, who are not EU members, as 
well as for the autonomies, of which only Åland decided to become part of 
the EU (in 1995).22 
Some of the core issues in which Nordic co-operation is well acknowledged 
are the creation of a common Nordic labor market, the Nordic social welfare 
model and close co-operation in cultural affairs.23 Since 1971, co-operation in 
cultural affairs between the five Nordic countries has been governed by a 
special agreement.24 Core questions that have fuelled Åland’s wish to be 
represented in the Nordic Council, and remain of great concern, have been, 
inter alia, to ensure broadcasting in the Swedish language for the Åland 
Islands and environmental issues around the Baltic Sea.25 Broadcasting and 
the protection of the environment are only two of the areas falling under the 
legislative competences of the Åland Islands and coinciding with the areas of 
Nordic co-operation. In fact, all three Nordic autonomous areas hold broad 
and notably exclusive legislative competences.  
Nordic co-operation can be expected to further expand in the coming 
years. One area of common Nordic concern that has been discussed 
repeatedly over the years is security and defence policy. Plans for a Nordic 
defence union had failed after World War II but in recent years, security and 
defence issues have regained impetus within Norden.26  
In sum, the Nordic co-operation endeavor can be described as a 
comprehensive regional integration enterprise, based on common cultural and 
linguistic traditions, but also including a considerable number of minority 
regimes and three comprehensive territorial arrangements. Its overall 
institutional framework will be introduced briefly in the following sections, 
 
 
21  Wendt, Cooperation in the Nordic Countries…, 39 et seqq. 
22  Ålands landskapsregering, Regeringsprogram för samarbete, resultat och framtidstro, Meddelande 
nr. 1/2011-2012, Mariehamn, 22 November 2011, 4. 
23  For an early analysis of the work of the Nordic Council see Erik Solem, The Nordic Council and 
Scandinavian Integration (Praeger Publishers, New York, 1977) and Wendt, Cooperation in the 
Nordic Countries...  
24  Agreement between Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden concerning cultural co-
operation. The agreement was signed on 15 March 1971 and entered into force 1 January 1972. 
Agreements amending the above-mentioned agreement signed on 13 June 1983, on 6 May 1985 and 
on 15 September 1989. The latest amendment came into force 1 June 1990, full text available 
online at http://www.norden.org/en/about-nordic-co-operation/agreements/treaties-and-
agreements/culture/agreement-concerning-cultural-co-operation, last visited 14 September 2013. 
25  Håkan Branders, “Hur Åland blev medlem av Nordiska rådet”, 94, in Ålands landsting, Åland i 
utveckling, festskrift utgiven av Ålands Landsting med anledning av självstyrelsens 60-årsjubileum 
den 9 juni 1982, (Ålands lagting, Mariehamn, 1982), 90–116; see Act on the Autonomy of Åland of 
1991 (FFS 16.8.1991/1144) (Act on the Autonomy of Åland), Sections 18 no. 10 and no. 20. 
26  See webpage of Norden, The History of the Nordic Council, at http://www.norden.org/en/nordic-
council/the-nordic-council/the-history-of-the-nordic-council, last visited 9 October 2013; Wendt, 
Cooperation in the Nordic Countries…, 25. 
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with special emphasis on the status quo of the autonomies within these 
frameworks. 
 
2.1 The Nordic Council 
The popularly elected assemblies of the Nordic countries and the Nordic 
autonomies co-operate in the Nordic Council.27 The Council currently has 87 
seats to which each parliament elects delegates from among its own members 
for a one-year term.28 The Council members are thus simultaneously members 
of their national parliaments or the parliaments of the autonomous 
territories. The Council has the power to initiate proposals and may give 
advice on matters pertaining to co-operation between all or some of the High 
Contracting Parties as well as the Faroe Islands, Greenland and Åland.29 It 
may also adopt recommendations and make other representations, as well as 
issue statements and submit questions to one or more of the governments or 
to the Council of Ministers.30 The right of initiative in the Council is extended 
beyond the elected delegates to government representatives, who participate 
in the work of the Council without, however, holding a right to vote.31 The 
parliamentarians and government representatives for each country constitute 
the respective national delegations.32  
The organs of the Nordic Council are the Plenary Assembly, the Presidium 
and the standing committees.33 The presidency rotates annually among the 
Nordic countries and all countries must be represented in the Presidium, 
which is responsible for dealing with overarching political and administrative 
matters, including the budgets of the Council and Council of Ministers as well 
as foreign affairs and defence and security policy.34 It is further provided that 
the Presidium’s composition shall reflect different political opinions.35 The 
Secretariat of the Presidium is to assist the work of the Nordic Council.36 
Currently, the Council has five Standing Committees whose members are 
elected by the Plenary Assembly. These are the Culture, Education and 
Training Committee, the Welfare Committee, the Citizens’ and Consumers’ 
 
 
27  Cf. Art. 44 Helsinki Treaty. 
28  Cf. Art. 47(1) & (4) Helsinki Treaty. 
29  Cf. Art 44 Helsinki Treaty. 
30  Cf. Arts. 45 & 57 Helsinki Treaty, § 59 Rules of Procedure of the Nordic Council of 1972 (Rules of 
Procedure of the Nordic Council). Following a decision of the Nordic Council of 2007, Art. 57 is 
today interpreted to apply also to the governments of the autonomous territories who may be 
addressed and respond to questions submitted by the Council, see Nordiska rådet, Yttrande om 
Nordiska ministerrådets initiative som kan förstärka de självstyrda områdenas deltagande i officiellt 
nordiskt samarbete, document 23, Nordiska rådets plenarförsamling 1 november 2007. 
31  Cf. Art, 47(5) & Art. 55 Helsinki Treaty. 
32  Cf. ibid. Art. 48(1). 
33  Cf. ibid. Art 50. 
34  Cf. ibid. Art. 52 (1) & (5) and §26 Rules of Procedure of the Nordic Council. 
35  Cf. ibid. Art. 52 (2). 
36  Cf. ibid. Art. 54. 
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Rights Committee, the Environment and Natural Resources Committee and 
the Business and Industry Committee.37 In addition, the Control Committee 
exercises parliamentary oversight over activities funded from the Nordic 
budgets and over the Election Committee for organising any elections held in 
the Plenary Assembly.38 Elected members of the Nordic Council are entitled 
to form party groups with a minimum of four members from a minimum of 
two countries.39 Currently, five party groups are represented while twelve 
delegates are not affiliated with either of these party groups.40  
 
The Autonomies in the Nordic Council 
At present, the Faroe Islands, Greenland and Åland each have two seats in 
the Nordic Council.41 These seats are filled by delegates elected from the 
members of the regional parliaments.42 The autonomies, just as the Member 
States, may delegate a desired number of representatives of their 
governments to participate in the work of the Council.43 The delegates and 
government representatives for the self-governing territories constitute their 
own Faroese, Greenlandic and Ålandic delegations.44 However, these 
delegations are in turn part of the national delegations.45 This could be 
described as a system of double delegations, which, it could be argued, pays 
regard to the actual status of autonomies, which form their own systems of 
government while being part of a larger sovereign entity. Delegates elected 
by the parliaments of the autonomous territories may hold certain offices 
only as members of national delegations.46 This concerns primarily the 
Presidium. Delegates from the autonomies are not excluded from being 
elected as president or vice-president or as members of the Presidium; 
 
 
37  Cf. ibid. Art. 53 and §§5, 32 Rules of Procedure of the Nordic Council. 
38  Cf. §§ 6 & 7 Rules of Procedure of the Nordic Council. 
39  Cf. ibid. §9; Party groups are entitled to a basic allowance  which is the same per group plus an 
allowance per member, the latter of which also non-affiliated members obtain, cf. §§ 77 and 78 
Rule of Procedure of the Nordic Council. 
40 See webpage of Norden, Nordiska rådets partigrupper, at http://www.norden.org/sv/om-
samarbetet/organisationer-og-institutioner/nordiska-raadets-partigrupper, last visited 24 
September 2013. 
41  Cf. Art. 47(2) Helsinki Treaty. 
42  Ibid. Arts. 44 & 47(3). 
43  Ibid. Art. 47(5). 
44  Ibid. Art. 48(2). 
45  Ibid. Art 48(1). 
46  This is clarified in Art. 58(2) of the Helsinki Treaty, which specifies who is to bear the costs of 
participation in the Council, that the term delegation refers to national delegations. The Rules of 
Procedure of the Nordic Council seem not to distinguish clearly between national delegation and 
delegation and it has to be determined within the overall legal framework whether an individual 
provision refers to a national delegation or includes the delegations of the autonomous territories. 
According to § 75(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the Nordic Council each delegation is responsible 
for ensuring that the decisions of the Council of Ministers are implemented. It is only logical to 
interpret this rule as applying to the autonomies where their governments have explicitly acceded 
to a decision of the Council of Ministers.  
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however, in these cases they are technically representing the national 
delegations.47 In Presidium meetings where matters affecting the Faroe 
Islands, Greenland or Åland are discussed, one of their respective delegates 
has the right to be present, speak and submit proposals.48  
The members of the Council’s committees are appointed by the Plenary.49 
Because there are only two elected representatives from each autonomous 
territory, many committees will lack representatives from the autonomies. In 
such committees, representatives from the Faroe Islands, Greenland or Åland 
may nonetheless take part in the meetings and, if so agreed with the Danish 
or Finnish committee members, replace a Danish or Finnish representative in 
the decision-making.50 The Control Committee plays an important role as it 
can submit its opinion to the Presidium on the interpretation of the Helsinki 
Treaty, other agreements on Nordic co-operation, the Rules of Procedure of 
the Nordic Council and other internal regulations.51 In meetings where 
matters affecting the Faroe Islands, Greenland and Åland are discussed, 
elected delegates representing the autonomies have the right to present, 
speak and submit proposals.52 It is established practice that the autonomies 
themselves determine whether a matter affects them.53 
 
2.2 The Nordic Council of Ministers 
The Nordic Council of Ministers is the institutionalised forum for the co-
operation of the governments of the Nordic countries, in which also the 
governments of the Nordic autonomies participate.54 Responsible for the 
overall coordination of matters of Nordic co-operation are the prime 
ministers of the Nordic countries. Each prime minister is assisted by his or her 
respective minister for co-operation and an under-secretary of state or a 
government official, who is a member of the national standing committees on 
Nordic co-operation.55 The Council of Prime Ministers is the prime face of the 
Council of Ministers, but, in fact, it would be more accurate to speak about 
‘Councils of Ministers’ in the plural as it encompasses altogether eleven 
Councils in which the ministers responsible for each area of co-operation are 
represented.56 Each sector-specific Council of Ministers is assisted by a 
 
 
47  Nordiska ministerrådet, De självstyrda områdena och det nordiska samarbetet. 
Generalsekreterarens kartläggning, ANP 2006:743, Copenhagen, 2006, 18. 
48  Cf. §23 Rules of Procedure of the Nordic Council. 
49  Cf. ibid. §32. 
50  Cf. ibid. §33(1) and (2). 
51  Cf. ibid. §43. 
52  Cf. ibid. §41(2). 
53  Nordiska ministerrådet, De självstyrda områdena och det nordiska samarbetet. 
Generalsekreterarens kartläggning, ANP 2006:743, Copenhagen, 2006, 18. 
54  Cf. Art. 60(1) and (2), Helsinki Treaty.  
55  Ibid. 61(2) & (3). 
56  See webpage of Norden, Nordic Council of Ministers, at http://www.norden.org/en/nordic-council-
of-ministers, last visited 6 October 2013. 
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committee of senior officials and by the Secretariat of the Council of 
Ministers, which is led by the General Secretary.57 
The Presidency of the Council of Ministers rotates annually among the five 
Nordic countries according to a fixed scheme.58 It is the Presidency that holds 
the responsibility for initiating actions and can thus shape the Council of 
Ministers’ programme for each term.59  
Each country has one vote in the Nordic Council.60 Decisions are made 
unanimously in the Council of Ministers and are binding for each country.61 If 
parliamentary approval is required, decisions are binding for all members 
when such approval has been obtained.62  
 
The Autonomies in the Nordic Council of Ministers 
While the Nordic autonomies are ‘represented’ in the Nordic Council, where 
their delegates ‘co-operate’ with their peers representing the national 
parliaments, the legal framework of the Nordic Council of Ministers employs a 
clear linguistic distinction and uses the term ‘participation’ with respect to 
the autonomies. In the context of the Nordic Council of Ministers ‘co-
operation’ is reserved for the High Contracting Parties, i.e. the Member 
States. 
Decisions of the Council of Ministers made under the Helsinki Treaty are 
binding on the Faroe Islands, Greenland and the Åland Islands only insofar as 
they accede to the decision in accordance with their statutes of self-
government.63 The autonomies, however, participate in the decision-making 
process, with the explicit right to participate in meetings of the Standing 
Committee of Nordic Co-operation and of the Committees of Senior 
Officials.64  
 
2.3 Nordic institutions, co-operative bodies and programmes 
The Council of Ministers’s decisions are not only implemented directly by the 
Member States, and where applicable by the governments of the autonomies, 
but also by a range of Nordic institutions and other bodies that are directly 
subordinate to the Nordic Council. There are currently around 45 such 
institutions and co-operative bodies, and more than 1500 distinct 
 
 
57  Cf. ibid. 61(4) and §13 Rules of Procedure of the Nordic Council of Ministers. 
58  Cf. Art. 61(3) Helsinki Treaty and §4 Rules of Procedure of the Nordic Council of Ministers; The 
presidencies in the Council and Council of Minister’s do not coincide to fall upon the same country 
simultaneously. 
59  Cf. Art. 61(3) Helsinki Treaty. 
60  Cf. Art. 62(2) Helsinki Treaty. 
61  Ibid. Arts. 62(3) and 63(1). 
62  Ibid. Art. 63(1). 
63  Cf. ibid. Art. 61(2). 
64  Cf. §11(1) Rules of Procedure of the Nordic Council of Ministers. 
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programmes.65 Among them are the Nordic House on the Faroe Islands and the 
two Nordic Institutes on Greenland and Åland, institutions involved mainly in 
cultural activities. The Nordic institutions, co-operative bodies and 
programmes deal with a wide range of issues, from research to culture to 
gender, the protection of the environment and international co-operation, to 
name but a few. In 1999, the Council of Ministers adopted a general statute 
for the Nordic Institutions, which also regulates the representation of the 
autonomies in the boards of these institutions. As a rule, representatives for 
the autonomies have the right to speak and submit proposals, but participate 
in the decision-making only when an institution is physically located on the 
territory of a respective autonomy.66 Exceptions, including full membership, 
can be granted by the Council of Ministers for Co-operation following a 
decision by the respective Council of Ministers responsible for the specific 
issue area that the institution in questions deals with.67 With a few 
exceptions, co-operation on equal terms in the Nordic programmes is thus 
open to the autonomies upon application.68 The autonomies are represented, 
inter alia, on the board of the Nordic Culture Fund and hold observer status in 
a number of institutions.69  
This brief description of the status quo only summarises the results of the 
political processes that have led to the adaptation of the Helsinki Treaty and 
enabled the successive institutional accommodation of the autonomies in 
Norden. Two such processes took place under the auspices of the Nordic 
Council, from 1969 to 1970 in the Kling Committee and from 1980 to 1983 in 
the Petri-Committee. In 2005, the issue of autonomy accommodation was 
taken up within the Council of Ministers. These processes will be outlined in 
the following sections as they serve well to highlight the challenges that 
international organisations face in finding solutions for autonomy 
accommodation as well as the possibilities that such international fora 
present for co-operation, not only between states but also between entities 
with limited statehood. 
 
 
65  Nordiska Ministerrådet, Betänkande från arbetsgruppen med uppgift att föreslå initiativ som kan 
förstärka de självstyrda områdenas deltagande i nordiskt samarbete, Åland, 5 September 2007, para 
3.1. See also webpage of Norden, Nordic Council of Ministers, Institutions and Other Co-operation 
Organisations, at http://www.norden.org/en/nordic-council-of-ministers/institutions-and-other-co-
operation-organisations, last visited 4 October 2013. 
66  Nordiska Ministerrådet, Betänkande från arbetsgruppen med uppgift att föreslå initiativ som kan 
förstärka de självstyrda områdenas deltagande i nordiskt samarbete, Åland, 5 September 2007, para 
3.4.1. 
67  Ibid. para. 3.4.2. 
68  Ibid. para. 3.5 and appendices. 
69  Ibid. para. 4.4 and appendices. 
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3. The Nordic Autonomies Enter the Stage: Considerations of the 
“Kling Committee” 
Since 1962, the Helsinki Treaty has been amended multiple times, in 1971, 
1983, 1985, 1991, 1993 and 1995. Of these amendments, those undertaken in 
1971 and 1983 respectively are most decisive for the current analysis. In 1971, 
Nordic co-operation opened up to the Faroes and Åland. Greenland became a 
self-governing territory in 1979 and was effectively admitted to Nordic co-
operation in 1983, when the status of the other two autonomies was also 
elevated. 
The Faroe Islands sought representation in the Nordic Council early on and 
at first achieved a national solution. From the late 1950s onwards, one of the 
two delegates to the Danish Parliament elected from the Faroe Islands was 
nominated as one of Denmark’s delegates or alternates to the Nordic 
Council.70 Håkan Branders, a former Finnish diplomat and former Secretary of 
the Nordic Council’s Cultural Committee, has tracked the first traces of the 
discussion of Åland’s potential representation on the Nordic Council to a 
motion brought to the Government of Åland by the Åland Parliament in 1957, 
asking for an investigation into the possibilities to gain such representation. 
The Åland Parliament reasoned at that point of time that a natural solution 
would be for Åland to be included in the delegation elected by the Parliament 
of Finland.71 This position evolved considerably over the years, and by the 
time it was formally discussed within the Nordic Council, Åland sought more 
or less fully-fledged membership, including the right to speak and voting 
rights in matters falling within Åland’s legislative competences.72  
The Nordic Council did not attend to the Nordic autonomies as such until 
1967, when an original motion by the Government of the Faroe Islands 
reached the Council in the form of a proposal by the Government of Denmark. 
The Danish proposal speaks about the “direct participation” of the Parliament 
and the Government of the Faroes in the work of the Nordic Council. It 
proposed concretely that two delegates nominated directly by the Parliament 
of the Faroe Islands should be represented in the Council as well as one 
representative for the Faroese Government. Denmark had motivated its 
proposal with reference to the fact that the Faroes actually exercise 
 
 
70  Branders, Hur Ålan…, 92. 
71  This in turn seems also to have motivated a member of the Swedish parliament to raise the question 
to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who replied by referring to the nature of the Nordic Council to 
be an organ for the co-operation between parliaments and governments, and concluding that for 
that reason Åland cannot constitute its own delegation and nor have seats or voting rights, see 
Branders, Hur Åland…, 93. 
72  Branders also maps the rather diffuse position then taken by the Finnish authorities, including a 
positive stance taken by the President and the generally passive although not obstructive position 
maintained over the course of time by the Finnish Government, ibid,101 et seqq. 
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legislative authority over many of the issue areas dealt with in the Nordic 
Council.73 
In subsequent years, the issue was elaborated in the Nordic Council. Under 
the auspices of the Committee for Legal Affairs, a committee composed of 
the ministers of justice of all five Nordic countries and the members of the 
Presidium, under the chairmanship of Sweden’s Minister of Justice Herman 
Kling, was seized with investigating the possibilities for representation of 
both the Faroe Islands and Åland. It was upon a written request of the 
Parliament of Åland to the Finnish Government, which underlined the 
inherent similarities between the autonomy regimes of the Faroes and Åland, 
that Åland was eventually included in the Council’s considerations.74 In its 
request, the Parliament of Åland speaks about the desired ‘accession’ as well 
as ‘membership’ of the Nordic Council.75 A point of departure for the Kling 
Committee was the generally agreed position that the self-governing 
territories shall gain ‘satisfactory representation’ in the Nordic Council.76  
The issue revealed three underlying dimensions, which occupied not only 
the Kling Committee in the late 1960s but also later expert groups. These 
dimensions or questions pertain (1) to the status of the ‘applicants’ and the 
quality of the autonomy regimes, (2) to implications of international law, and 
(3) to the modalities of possible accommodation. These dimensions are easily 
discernible in a number of documents and memoranda that informed the 
Committee.77  
 
 
73  Regeringsförslag om representation för Färöarna i Nordiska rådet (Väckt av Danmarks regering), B 
4/j, Nordiska rådet, 16:e sessionen, 1968, 1374. 
74  On the preceding internal debate on Åland, see Branders, Hur Åland ..., 96 et seqq; Skrivelse till 
Nordiska rådet från Nordiska kommittén för utredning av formerna för de självstyrda områdenas 
representation i Nordiska rådet, B 4/j, Bilaga 3, Nordiska rådet, 16:e sessionen, 1968, 1413. 
75  Skrivelse från Åland landsting till Finland regering rörande ansökan om medlemskap i Nordiska rådet 
för landskapet Åland, Bilaga 2, Bihang 1, Nordiska rådet, 16:e sessionen, 1968, 1376. 
76  Skrivelse till Nordiska rådet från Nordiska kommittén för utredning av formerna för de självstyrda 
områdenas representation i Nordiska rådet, B 4/j, Bilaga 3, Nordiska rådet, 16:e sessionen, 1968, 
1413. 
77  Cf. the following appendices to Nordiska rådet, 16:e sessionen, B4/j, 1968: Skrivelse från Åland 
landsting till Finland regering rörande ansökan om medlemskap i Nordiska rådet för landskapet 
Åland, Bilaga 2, B 4/j, Bihang 1, 1968, 1375 f; PM angående landskapet Ålands självstyrelse 
(Utarbetat av lagstiftningsråd Henry Ådahl), B 4/j, Bilaga 2, Bihang 3; Notat om Færøernes 
hjemmestyre (Udarbejdet af fuldmægtig Ole Perch Nielsen), B 4/j, Bilaga 2, Bihang 4; PM om 
tänkbara former för de självstyrda områdenas representation i Nordiska rådet (sammanställd av 
huvudsekreteraren i Nordiska kommittén för utredning av formerna för de självstyrda områdenas 
representation i Nordiska rådet), B 4/j, Bilaga 2, Bihang 2, 1394 et seqq; Oversigt over de 
sagområder, der pr. 1 januar 1967 overtaget af Færøernes hjemmestyre som særanliggender 
(Udarbejdet av Statsministeriet), B 4/j, Bilaga 2, Bihang 5; PM om tänkbara former för de 
självstyrda områdenas representation i Nordiska rådet (sammanställd av huvudsekreteraren i 
Nordiska kommittén för utredning v formerna för de självstyrda områdenas representation i 
Nordiska rådet), B 4/j, Bilaga 2, Bihang 2, 1404 et seqq; PM rörande material av betydelse för 
regeringsförslaget (Uppsatt av Nordiska rådets sekretariat), B 4/j, Bilaga 2, 1968, 1375; The 
Council’s Secretariat later also composed a memorandum comparing both autonomy regimes, this is 
mentioned in Skrivelse till Nordiska rådet från Nordiska kommittén för utredning av formerna för de 
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The first dimension, the nature and legal status of the autonomies as such, 
does not feature very much in the ensuing discussion and it seems that it was 
never questioned that the Nordic autonomies qualified for some sort of 
accommodation in the Nordic Council. The Committee familiarised itself with 
the legal frameworks and functioning of the autonomy regimes and decided 
at the outset that representation for the Faroes and Åland should follow the 
same principles due to the great similarities between both regimes.78 It was 
apparent from the original Danish proposal, as well as the documents 
submitted by the Government of Finland, that there were no internal 
conflicts as to the respective delimitations of competences and that neither 
of the Member States was opposed to the idea of accommodation as such. A 
further evaluation of the autonomy regimes hardly fell within the 
Committee’s competences. 
The status of the ‘applicants’ nonetheless was a crucial factor in respect of 
the second area of concern, the international law dimension, which arose 
intrinsically from the fact that an international organisation based on a treaty 
between states was now to accommodate two autonomies in one way or 
another. So, while the specific autonomy regimes were not discussed in great 
detail, the ‘collision’ of an international framework with two autonomy 
regimes proved to be the core concern. The international law implications 
were a decisive factor in determining which institutional modalities for 
accommodation were feasible. 
A four-page memorandum composed by the Kling Committee on the 
implications of international law arising in connection with Faroes’ and 
Åland’s representation on the Nordic Council is of particular interest for the 
present analysis.79 The Kling Committee remained rather superficial in its 
analysis. It simply acknowledged (a) that it was most intensely discussed after 
World War II whether national minorities were subjects of international law 
and that this was ultimately denied; (b) It further noted that Chapter XI of 
the Charter of the United Nations sets out a declaration regarding non-self-
governing territories, which has been applied exclusively to colonised 
territories; the authors of the memorandum did not fail to note, however, 
that it had been discussed whether it might be applicable to territories 
inhabited by national minorities; and (c) the Committee noted that the 
participation of ‘non-sovereign territories’ in international intergovernmental 
organisations is unusual and that in such rare cases association is the 
dominant form of co-operation.80 The Committee did not find evidence for 
the participation of non-sovereign territories in inter-parliamentary organs 
and arrived at the conclusion that neither in the statutes of the Council of 
Europe, the founding treaties of the European Economic Community or the 
 
 
självstyrda områdenas representation i Nordiska rådet rörande kommittén sammansättning, möten 
m.m., B 4/j, Bilaga 7, Nordiska rådet, 18:e sessionen, 1970, 1626. 
78  Kommitténs förslag, B 4/j, Bilaga 8, Nordiska rådet, 18:e sessionen, 1970, 1629. 
79
 Några folkrättsliga frågor i samband med Färöarnas och Ålands representation i Nordiska rådet, B 4/j, 
Bilaga 6, Nordiska rådet, 18:e sessionen, 1970, 1622 et seqq. 
80
  Ibid. 1622. 
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statutes of the Inter-Parliamentary Union can such arrangements be found.81 
It included in the memorandum a non-exclusive list of past and present 
arrangements for the accommodation of sub-state entities. Here, the 
Committee acknowledged arrangements within the Commission for Technical 
Co-operation in Africa South of the Sahara (CCTA), the Food and Agricultural 
Organisation of the United Nations (FAO), the International Telegraph Union 
(ITU), the Universal Postal Union (UPU), the World Health Organisation (WHO) 
and the World Meteorological Organisation (WMO).82 The memorandum does 
not offer further analysis or conclusions. However, it includes examples for 
different modalities of accomodation. With the exception of the CCTA, all 
organisations listed granted only associated membership with either no voting 
rights (FAO, ITU), limited voting rights (WMO) or conditional voting rights 
(UPU) to “territori[es] not fully responsible for the conduct of [their] 
international relations”.83 The Committee underlined that the international 
organisations listed all fulfil specialised functions. 
The third dimension, the concrete options and modalities for 
accommodation, then occupied the Kling Committee in great detail. Four 
possible modes of representation were discussed, including: (1) “equal 
status” with Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden; (2) a guarantee 
for members of the Faroese and Ålandic parliaments to be part of the Danish 
and Finnish delegations respectively, with the possibility to correspondingly 
link Faroese and Ålandic government representatives to the respective 
delegations; (3) a guarantee for the respective Faroese and Ålandic delegates 
to Denmark’s and Finland’s parliaments to be part of the Danish and Finnish 
delegations by virtue of national legislation; and (4) representation with the 
right to speak but no voting rights, i.e. some form of qualified observer 
status.84  
The major crux in the subsequent discussion was whether the autonomies 
could accede to the Helsinki Treaty and become independent members of the 
Nordic Council. The Kling Committee framed this as a question of equality 
between the sovereign Member States and the autonomous territories. This 
alternative was considered as highly problematic due to the very nature of 
autonomy, i.e. the limited capacity to enter into international relations. 
Although both the Faroes and Åland hold very broad and notably exclusive 
law-making powers, certain questions remain within the exclusive domain of 
the state, including foreign affairs, in whole or in part. Unlike some of the 
organisations listed by the Committee in the memorandum mentioned above, 
 
 
81
  Ibid. 1622 et seq. 
82
  Ibid. 1623 et seq. 
83
  This is a formulation cited to recur in the statutes of the Food and Agricultural Organisations, the 
International Telegraph Union,  and the World Health Organisation, see Några folkrättsliga frågor i 
samband med Färöarnas och Ålands representation i Nordiska rådet, B 4/j, Bilaga 6, Nordiska rådet, 
18:e sessionen, 1970, 1622–1624. 
84  PM om tänkbara former för de självstyrda områdenas representation i Nordiska rådet (sammanställd 
av huvudsekreteraren i Nordiska kommittén för utredning av formerna för de självstyrda områdenas 
representation i Nordiska rådet), B 4/j, Bilaga 2, Bihang 2, Nordiska rådet, 16:e sessionen, 1968, 
1377 et seqq. 
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the Nordic Council is not an expert organ but an organisation that covers a 
broad range of issues, some of those falling under the exclusive competences 
of the Member States and not the autonomies, notwithstanding their broad 
legislative powers. Proposing changes in the national legal frameworks or the 
legal frameworks for the autonomies was far beyond the Committee’s 
mandate. The Kling Committee turned towards the question whether it would 
be possible to admit the autonomies to the Nordic Council but granting voting 
rights selectively and corresponding to the national delimitations of 
competences between Denmark and the Faroes and Finland and Åland. Such a 
selective approach, however, was considered to necessitate a case-by-case 
assessments of whether an issue fell within the domain of the autonomies or 
of the respective state. An additionally aggravating element of this problem 
was that the delimitation of powers between the Faroes and Denmark on the 
one hand, and Åland and Finland on the other hand, does not fully coincide. 
The Nordic Council, in any case, has no mandate to interpret national 
legislation and is not prepared to resolve questions pertaining to the internal 
delimitation of competences.85 Thus, the autonomies were not considered to 
fit in neatly with the states that had concluded the Helsinki Treaty. The 
international law implications weighed too heavily and ultimately posed too 
many technical challenges to be resolved within the framework of the 
Helsinki Treaty at the end of the 1960s.86 Interestingly, in its discussion of 
alternative (1), the Committee nonetheless drafted new rules concerning the 
numerical representation in the Council, which served as the basis for the 
solution ultimately found.87 
Different modalities for observer status according to alternative (4) were 
drawn up, including the right to initiative and the possibility of indicating 
votes without these becoming part of the official count. Finally, observer 
status was rejected, as 
“not to give the self-governing territories the measure of insight and 
influence in the work of the Council that would correspond to the 
territories’ interest in being able to take part in shaping the inter-Nordic 
regulation of such legal, economic and other questions which are 
encompassed by the territories’ autonomy legislation”.88  
This left the Kling Committee with two options, which were both based on 
representation of the autonomies within the existing structures and as part of 
the respective national delegations. The final question concerned the 
nomination of delegates from the Faroes and Åland. Alternative (3) was to 
 
 
85  Ibid. 1377 et seqq. 
86  Kommitténs förslag, B 4/j, Bilaga 8, Nordiska rådet, 18:e sessionen, 1970, 1629 et seqq. 
87  PM om tänkbara former för de självstyrda områdenas representation i Nordiska rådet (sammanställd 
av huvudsekreteraren i Nordiska kommittén för utredning av formerna för de självstyrda områdenas 
representation i Nordiska rådet), B 4/j, Bilaga 2, Bihang 2, Nordiska rådet, 16:e sessionen, 1968, 
1378 et seqq. 
88  Kommitténs förslag, B 4/j, Bilaga 8, Nordiska rådet, 18:e sessionen, 1970, 1629, author’s 
translation. 
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rely on the Faroese and Ålandic members of the national parliaments, which 
both form electoral constituencies for the purposes of national elections, so 
that both territories are also represented in the national parliaments. While 
originally it seems to have been envisaged that such a solution would demand 
guarantees by virtue of national legislation, the Kling Committee also 
considered the possibility to amend the Council’s rules of procedure with the 
requirement, not only to ensure that the national delegations would 
represent the complete political spectrum presented in the national 
parliaments but to include also members of parliament from the Faroes and 
Åland.89 Ultimately, this alternative was considered as too limited. The 
autonomies as such would not have gained access to the Nordic Council, as 
still no members of their regional parliaments were to be represented. 
Representation would, at best, have been indirect.90  
Thus, alternative (2) was eventually preferred. It was argued that only 
through electing their representatives directly from among their midst could 
the parliaments of the self-governing territories gain genuine access and 
become engaged in questions of Nordic co-operation. Genuine engagement 
was, after all, desired not only by the autonomies but also by all High 
Contracting Parties. It was decided that the Faroe Islands, then with 38,000 
inhabitants, were to elect two delegates while the Åland Islands, then with 
22,000 inhabitants, were to elect one delegate.91 Notably, these delegates 
would then be part of the respective national delegations. Nonetheless, this 
raised questions of proportionality and thus required the adaptation of the 
overall number of seats. In order to accommodate three additional 
representatives without having to reduce the seats reserved for delegates 
representing the Danish and the Finnish parliaments, the overall number of 
seats was increased keeping a proportional ratio of delegates per country 
determined by the size of their populations. The number of seats in the 
Nordic Council was raised from 73 to 78, which meant additional seats not 
only for the Danish and Finnish delegations but also for Iceland, Norway and 
Sweden. In addition, the governments of the autonomous territories were to 
be endowed with the possibility to nominate representatives to the Council.92 
As governments did not hold voting rights, no proportionality implications 
were raised by the fact that governments of the autonomies were now 
admitted to participate in the work of the Council.93 The Kling Committee 
submitted a complete draft of the revisions necessary in the Helsinki Treaty. 
Corresponding changes were also implemented in the Council’s rules of 
procedure to ensure that the autonomies would be included in the practical 
 
 
89  PM om tänkbara former för de självstyrda områdenas representation i Nordiska rådet (sammanställd 
av huvudsekreteraren i Nordiska kommittén för utredning av formerna för de självstyrda områdenas 
representation i Nordiska rådet), B 4/j, Bilaga 2, Bihang 2, Nordiska rådet, 16:e sessionen, 1968, 
1378. 
90  Ibid. 1379. 
91  Kommitténs förslag, B 4/j, Bilaga 8, Nordiska rådet, 18:e sessionen, 1970, 1630. 
92  Ibid. 1630. 
93  Ibid. 1631. 
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aspects of co-operation and provided with all communication in the same 
timely manner as the Nordic countries.94  
Although the autonomies were not admitted to full membership, it can be 
argued that the 1969 solution made way for direct participation in Nordic co-
operation and thus responded to Denmark’s proposal.95 The representatives 
for the Faroes and Åland participated in the Council’s sessions for the first 
time in 1970.96 Originally, it was envisaged that the Kling Committee was to 
complete its work already in 1968 but extraordinary elections in Denmark 
delayed the process.97 However, in retrospect it seems fair to say that the 
autonomies were accommodated rather swiftly, thanks to the general 
consensus among the Nordic countries and the deliberate solution carved by 
the Kling Committee. The level of accommodation that was effectively 
instituted in 1970 opened up Nordic co-operation, until then reserved to fully 
sovereign states, to two autonomous regions with broad and exclusive 
legislative competences without formally extending membership. Indeed, 
membership was not considered a prerequisite for representation and full 
voting rights in the Council. Writing in 1982, Branders describes the Åland 
Islands early experiences of Nordic co-operation as outright positive and 
indeed the Åland Islands have been actively engaged in Nordic co-operation 
ever since.98  
Looking merely at the Nordic Council, the question of accession (full 
membership) versus representation seems to have very limited practical 
relevance. It is symbolic nonetheless. Indeed, originally the delegates from 
the Faroe Islands and Åland were formally Danish and Finnish representatives 
respectively and their regional identities were not acknowledged in the form 
of own delegations. However, the Kling Committee deliberately opted to link 
the regional parliaments to the Nordic Council and the delegates from the 
Faroes and Åland were endowed with unqualified voting rights, irrespective of 
their ‘home’ parliaments’ legislative competences and thus as individuals 
held equal standing. When the Kling Committee was mandated with finding a 
 
 
94  Betänkande av Nordiska rådets juridiska utskott över regeringsförslaget, B 4/j, Bilaga 10, Nordiska 
rådet, 18:e sessionen, 1970, 1635 et seqq. 
95  PM om tänkbara former för de självstyrda områdenas representation i Nordiska rådet (sammanställd 
av huvudsekreteraren i Nordiska kommittén för utredning av formerna för de självstyrda områdenas 
representation i Nordiska rådet), B 4/j, Bilaga 2, Bihang 2, Nordiska rådet, 16:e sessionen, 1968, 
1379. 
96  Betänkande av Nordiska rådets juridiska utskott över regeringsförslaget, B 4/j, Bilaga 10, Nordiska 
rådet, 18:e sessionen, 1970, 1632 et seqq; See also Wendt, Cooperation in the Nordic Countries, 44. 
97  Skrivelse till Nordiska rådet från Nordiska kommittén för utredning av formerna för de självstyrda 
områdenas representation i Nordiska rådet, B 4/j, Bilaga 3, Nordiska rådet, 16:e sessionen, 1968, 
1414. 
98  Branders, Hur Åland blev medlem av Nordiska rådet, 113; Nordiska ministerrådet, De självstyrda 
områdena och det nordiska samarbetet. Generalsekreterarens kartläggning, ANP 2006:743, 
Copenhagen, 2006, 23 et seq. Today, the delegation of the Åland Islands reports annually to the 
Åland Parliament about its activities in the Nordic Council and the items of business it has deemed 
particularly relevant for the Åland Islands. For the latest report, see Ålands lagting, Ålands 
delegations I Nordiska rådet berättelse för tiden 1.1.2011–31.12.2011, Berättelse NRB 1/2011-2012. 
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way to accommodate the autonomies, the Nordic Council essentially 
exercised only advisory functions. Neither then nor today does the Nordic 
Council take binding decisions, but it adopts recommendations, makes 
representations, issues statements or asks questions. Of course, the question 
of accession and that of representation with voting rights, carries very 
different implications with regard to an inter-governmental body with binding 
decision-making powers, where Member States intend to exercise 
sovereignty. It is somewhat odd that the questions of accommodation in the 
Nordic Council of Ministers was not addressed by the Kling Committee when 
the creation of the intergovernmental body was taking place in parallel at the 
end of the 1960s. Neither the Council nor Denmark nor any of the other 
Member States seems to have seen a need to anticipate the questions, which 
must have been an obvious issue to arise in the near future. 
 
4. From Direct Representation to ‘Own’ Delegations: 
Considerations of the “Petri Committee” 
The Nordic Council of Ministers was established in 1971 and once again the 
Nordic autonomies were left outside a central organ of Nordic co-operation. 
Based on a decision by the Council of Ministers in 1976, the representatives 
for the Faroes and Åland were admitted to participate in the meetings of the 
Council of Ministers and the committees of senior officials. Participation, 
however, was not formalised.99  
In 1980, Denmark once again submitted a proposal to the Nordic Council. 
The Danish proposal did not only address the question of the Faroe Islands’ 
‘independent’ representation, as opposed to ‘direct’ in 1967, but extended 
even to Greenland, which by 1979 had become autonomous.100 ‘Independent’ 
representation referred to accession and full membership, a demand that had 
been denied but was now discussed again under the auspices of the Nordic 
Council. A high-level committee under the leadership of Swedish Minister of 
Justice Carl Axel Petri was seized with examining, (a) the possibilities and 
practical consequences of Greenland’s participation in Nordic co-operation 
against the background that Greenland was thus far lacking representation; 
(b) the possibilities and practical consequences of independent Faroese and 
Greenlandic representation; and (c) the possibilities to strengthen the 
Faroes’, Greenland’s and Åland’s participation and influence in Nordic co-
operation “under all circumstances”.101 The subsequent process within the 
 
 
99  Färöarnas, Grönlands och Ålands representation in Nordiska rådet. Betänkande avgivit av kommittén 
för utredning av frågan om Färöarnas, Grönlands och Åland representation i Nordiska rådet, NU 
1982:6, 23. 
100  Regeringsförslag om färöisk och grönländsk representation I Nordiska rådet, B 29/j, Nordiska rådet, 
28: sessionen, 1980, 904. 
101  Färöarnas, Grönlands och Ålands representation in Nordiska rådet. Betäkande avgivit av kommittén 
för utredning av frågan om Färöarnas, Grönlands och Åland representation i Nordiska rådet, NU 
1982:6, 24. 
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Nordic Council resembles the events of 1967 to 1970.102 Again, the question 
revealed three underlying dimensions, pertaining to (1) the status of the 
autonomies, (2) the international law implications, and (3) the practical 
modalities for accommodation.  
While the Nordic autonomies’ basic demands were well known to the Kling 
Committee, in 1967 these were communicated through the respective states 
and thus considered only indirectly. By 1980, the Faroes and Åland had been 
formally admitted to Nordic co-operation and had thus been formally 
endowed with the capacity to participate in Nordic co-operation through the 
Nordic Council, which is clearly visible in the way that the Petri Committee 
engaged directly with the autonomies. In the course of its work, the Petri 
Committee gave the Nordic autonomies the chance to comment on its draft 
position, which notably did not respond entirely to the autonomies’ demands. 
The issues raised thereupon by the autonomies and the Åland Islands in 
particular have subsequently influenced the Committee’s work and visibly 
shaped its conclusions in major aspects.103 While full membership was the 
overall desire, the Nordic autonomies’ core demands pertained to their 
representation in the Nordic Council with ‘independent’ delegations, 
representation in the Presidium of the Nordic Council, the possibility of 
representation in all Council committees, representation in the Nordic 
Council of Ministers, including in decision-making whenever autonomous 
competences are concerned, as well as participation in the preparation and 
implementation of decisions within the Committees of Senior Officials.104 The 
autonomies were more detailed in their demand than merely asking for a 
right to accede to the Helsinki Treaty, so that once again there was a margin 
for discussing solutions that would satisfy the autonomies, at least in part, 
without opening up for full membership. 
The Petri Committee followed a number of basic propositions, which had 
already framed the work of the Kling Committee, including treating all three 
autonomies alike and seeking a solution for the accommodation of the 
autonomies without changing the national legal frameworks for self-
government or allowing for the interpretation of autonomy legislation on the 
Nordic level.105 Once again, accession was not an option. The Petri 
Committee argued that co-operation in the Nordic Council is based on the co-
operation of states, whose decisive characteristic it considered to be the 
capacity to maintain independently international relations. The Committee 
felt the need to underline the importance of this core characteristic of 
statehood for the purposes of Nordic co-operation by pointing to those 
provisions of the Helsinki Treaty that refer to the external relations of the 
 
 
102  Reference to the work of the Kling Committee is made at several points during in the Petri 
Committee’s report, see for example ibid. 27. 
103  Ibid. 26. 
104  Ibid. 8 & 25 et seqq. 
105  Ibid. 27 et seqq. 
Stephan – Making Autonomies Matter 
 
www.eurac.edu/edap 25 edap@eurac.edu 
Nordic Council as a whole.106 In a two-page memorandum which partly 
summarised the corresponding analysis of 1968, the Petri Committee 
concluded that international law had at the time being not opened up to 
territorial autonomies. Membership of the United Nations and its organs, as 
well as of most other international organisations, remained reserved for the 
state as the subject of international law.107 The terminology of ‘subjects’ 
recurs throughout the discussion. The Committee emphasised the difference 
between micro-states and non-sovereign territories and referred to the 
relevant discourses of the time, which were focussed on entities such as the 
Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), which, so the Committee, could not 
be considered a subject of international law per se. It was also pointed out 
that federal states and entities similar to the Nordic autonomies, such as 
Northern Ireland, the Channel Islands and former colonies such as 
Guadeloupe, Martinique, Puerto Rico, Hong Kong and Macau, have special 
statuses but cannot be considered as subjects of international law. Finally, 
the Committee argued that the attention paid to national minorities in recent 
debates was reflected increasingly in the work of international organisations 
and that the international community had become more sensitive to the 
concerns of, for example, the PLO, which could be entitled to observer 
status. From these observations, the Committee arrived at the conclusion 
that there was an increased awareness of the need for participatory 
structures in the international community at that time. However, it 
considered sovereign statehood to remain the threshold for membership in 
international organisations, so that no more than observer status could be 
awarded to national minorities in such contexts.108 The Petri Committee, just 
like its predecessor, remains rather superficial in its discussion and does not 
devote time to distinguish between minorities and autonomies. In fact, the 
conclusions drawn relate merely to full membership and neither Kling and 
Petri nor their colleagues considered other forms of participation to be a 
question intruding upon the realm of international law. Göran Lindholm, 
writing about the work of the Petri Committee in the mid-1980s, remarked 
that its work followed a traditional school of thought in describing 
international law as an order of co-existence, while at that time international 
relations had already progressed to focus on co-operation between different, 
indeed dissimilar, entities.109  
 
 
106  Ibid. 28 and 35. 
107  Färöarnas, Grönlands och Ålands representation in Nordiska rådet. Betänkande avgivit av kommittén 
för utredning av frågan om Färöarnas, Grönlands och Åland representation i Nordiska rådet, Bilaga 
4, Promemoria med folkrättsliga synpunkter på frågan om Färöarnas, Grönlands och Ålands 
representation i Nordiska rådet, NU 1982:6, 76. 
108  Ibid. 75 et seq. 
109  Göran Lindholm, “The Right of Autonomous Regions to Participate in Nordic Co-Operation”, 54 
Nordisk Tidsskrift for International Ret (1985), 79-84, 79 et seq. 
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With respect to the Nordic Council, the autonomies’ essential demand in 
1980 was to form independent delegations.110 Thus far, their delegates were 
elected directly by the regional parliaments but could not form delegations of 
their own. The option of forming ‘independent’ delegations was discarded 
early with reference to the international law implication already elaborated 
upon by the Kling Committee. Apparently, the idea of independent 
delegations was equated with full membership. In fact, the question was then 
re-framed and became not one of ‘independent’ but ‘own’ delegations. The 
autonomies’ own delegations were in turn to form part of the national 
delegations. The Petri Committee struggled with the use of the term 
‘delegation’, as it feared that two levels of delegation would render the term 
void of actual meaning and give rise to confusion.111 Nonetheless, ultimately 
this is the solution agreed upon and in force today, a system of double 
delegations if you will.112 Certain matters, such as the election of the 
members and secretary of the Presidium and the distribution of seats in the 
committees, remain reserved to the national delegations, although in these 
instances delegation terminology is avoided altogether. Instead, the Helsinki 
Treaty and Council’s rules of procedure speak of Nordic countries or merely 
countries, thereby excluding the autonomies from the provision’s scope.113  
With regard to the number of seats to be granted to the now three 
autonomies, the Petri Committee drew up a number of alternatives for the 
distribution of seats, taking into account that neither Denmark nor Finland 
was willing to accept a reduction of seats for the representatives of their 
national parliaments. Ultimately, the overall number of seats was increased 
to 87 with the Faroes, Greenland and Åland having two seats each.114  
Due to much the same reasons that justified its objection against 
independent representation, the Committee also took a negative stance 
towards a guaranteed representation of the autonomies in the Presidium but 
had no objections to possible consultations. Although the Committee did not 
consider it necessary to formalise such procedures, the solution was 
 
 
110  Färöarnas, Grönlands och Ålands representation in Nordiska rådet. Betänkande avgivit av kommittén 
för utredning av frågan om Färöarnas, Grönlands och Åland representation i Nordiska rådet, NU 
1982:6, 28 et seqq. 
111  Färöarnas, Grönlands och Ålands representation in Nordiska rådet. Betänkande avgivit av kommittén 
för utredning av frågan om Färöarnas, Grönlands och Åland representation i Nordiska rådet, NU 
1982:6, 32. 
112  The Committee, once it had objected to the concept of entirely separate delegations, did not 
consider it necessary to make the financial implications of the representation of the Nordic 
autonomies a matter of Nordic concerns. As the autonomies would not be represented 
independently the financial contributions of the autonomies to the Nordic Council were considered 
a matter of national concern, see Färöarnas, Grönlands och Ålands representation in Nordiska rådet. 
Betänkande avgivit av kommittén för utredning av frågan om Färöarnas, Grönlands och Åland 
representation i Nordiska rådet, NU 1982:6, 33. 
113  Cf. for example Art. 52 Helsinki Treaty. 
114  Färöarnas, Grönlands och Ålands representation in Nordiska rådet. Betänkande avgivit av kommittén 
för utredning av frågan om Färöarnas, Grönlands och Åland representation i Nordiska rådet, NU 
1982:6, 31. 
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eventually formalised in the Rules of Procedure of the Nordic Council as this 
was desired by the Åland Islands in particular.115 The Committee took a 
positive stance towards the autonomies’ wish to maintain own secretariats, as 
this would support efficient co-operation. Åland at that point had already 
instituted its own secretariat.116 The Committee considered it most 
appropriate to solve the formal aspects under national law, however.117 
Consultations presented also the preferred solution to the question of 
representation in the Council’s committees. It was not considered feasible to 
admit the autonomies to more committees than corresponding to their 
number of elected delegates, i.e., a maximum of two. The Committee found, 
however, that the Rules of Procedure of the Nordic Council should be 
amended so as to allow explicitly for inviting representatives of the 
governments of the autonomies to participate in the committee 
deliberations, although not in the decision-making. Further, it was provided 
that in committees without representatives from the Faroese, Greenland or 
Åland, an elected member may take part, and, if so agreed upon with the 
respective Danish and Finnish member, replace the member elected by the 
national parliament in the decision-making.118 
By 1980, the right to submit proposals to the Council had been extended 
beyond the parliamentary representatives of the Nordic Council to apply also 
to governments and the Council of Ministers. The autonomies now demanded 
that their governments be provided with the same right of initiative, a 
demand that the Committee fully supported.119 
The final demand addressed by the Committee was for representation in 
the Nordic Council of Ministers. It is with regard to the Council of Ministers 
that the international law concerns discussed by both, the Kling and the Petri 
Committees, remain the most immediate. What was framed as independent 
representation was ultimately the question of accession as high contracting 
parties to the Helsinki Treaty. As mentioned above, the autonomies had had 
access to co-operation in the Council of Ministers since 1976 by virtue of a 
simple decision. However, the governments of the Faroe Islands, Greenland 
and Åland were, and still remain, excluded from formal decision-making, i.e. 
they do not hold voting rights and, considering that voting in the Council of 
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Ministers is unanimous, no veto rights. However, they cannot be bound by the 
decisions falling within their exclusive domains. The Petri Committee 
followed what seems to have been a proposal by the Åland Islands, namely to 
open up for the possibility of the autonomies to accede to the decisions of 
the Council of Ministers in areas falling within their competences.120 This 
resembles the solution found on the national level in Finland with regard to 
the entry into force of international treaties concerning the Åland Islands.121 
The suggestions made by the Petri Committee entered into force in 1983. 
In sum, it could be argued that the Petri Committee worked its way 
successfully around full membership and tried to find solutions to the detailed 
demands without opening up for accession. Its work has led to the creation of 
own delegations for the autonomies and at least opened the doors to all 
committees and to the Council of Ministers. Decision-making in the Council, 
however, is a door that remains closed for the autonomies. 
 
5. Ålandsdokumentet: Functional Membership and Visibility 
It was not until 2005 that the issue of autonomy accommodation again 
appeared on the Nordic agenda. It was upon a Faroese proposal submitted 
directly to the Council and Council of Ministers in 2003 that the Ministers for 
Co-operation decided to map the position of the self-governing territories 
within Nordic co-operation “without bias”.122 In May 2006, the Council of 
Ministers’ General Secretary Per Unckel presented a report on the legal and 
practical aspects of the participation of the autonomies, which was informed 
by written and oral contributions of legal experts from Sweden, Denmark and 
Finland.123 Unckel’s report in turn informed a working group that was 
established under the auspices of the Council of Ministers and was composed, 
notably, not only of representatives of the national governments but also of 
the autonomies’ governments.124 The Kling and Petri Committees had 
operated under the auspices of the Nordic Council. Now, for the first time, 
the Council of Ministers took the lead. The Ministers for Co-operation 
specifically excluded the option of full membership at the outset and 
directed the working group, which presented its result in the so-called Åland 
document (Ålandsdokumentet) in the autumn of 2007, to explore the 
possibilities for strengthened forms of co-operation, in specific institutions 
and sub-programmes of Norden.125 The mandate of the working group was 
thus rather limited and did not include the possibility of making proposals 
concerning the Council of Ministers as such.126 A reform of co-operation in 
 
 
120  Ibid. 26 and 37. 
121  Cf. Section 59 Act on the Autonomy of Åland. 
122  Nordiska ministerrådet, De självstyrda områdena och det nordiska samarbetet. 
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123  Ibid. 
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cultural affairs preceded the work of the working group and even here a 
central aspect of the reform was the inclusion of the autonomies in all 
aspects of cultural co-operation, which is implemented within the broad 
range of Nordic institutions and programs.127  
While the Faroe Islands and Greenland applied explicitly for accession and 
full membership, the Åland Islands used less determined terminology and 
voiced as its major concern the maintenance of its ability to express its own, 
distinct opinions within the institutions of Nordic co-operation.128 The 
Government of Åland further emphasised that it desired a form of co-
operation, which also in the future would allow each autonomy to take the 
initiative for increased participation, independent of the other two 
territories. The Åland Islands emphasised their wish to retain the possibility 
to take up the issue of increased participation at a later time, apparently not 
wanting to lock itself into one position or any once-and-for-all solution.129 
Although here the autonomies clearly do not follow one and the same 
approach, in 2007 the Faroes, Greenland and Åland signed a non-binding 
memorandum of co-operation, which, inter alia, sets out their aim to hold 
meetings on the level of government officials and among the elected 
delegates in connection with the Council’s sessions and consult each other 
before meetings of the Council of Ministers. It also foresees the possibility of 
creating ad hoc working groups and pooling secretarial functions.130 
Its mandate did not allow the 2006 to 2007 working group to dwell upon 
the same questions as the Kling and Petri Committees did. However, the 
General Secretary’s preceding report maps the status quo and highlights much 
the same issues as were taken up by Kling and Petri, with an important 
difference. What was hinted at in the Petri Committee’s memorandum only 
as an emerging trend had become manifest to the legal experts consulted by 
Unckel. It was argued that the monopoly-like position of states on the 
international plane had diminished and that international co-operation has 
developed with regard to members, issues and geographical scope. Unckel 
emphasises the dispositive character of international law and the discretion 
of international organisations in determining its criteria for membership. In 
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2006 Unckel spoke of “functional membership”.131 His analysis relied heavily 
on Ulf Bernitz’ expert statement attached to his report.132 What is interesting 
to note is that Bernitz, a professor of European law at the University of 
Stockholm, refers to and elaborates further on the terms of membership of 
what the Kling Committee called expert organisations such as the WPU and 
the WMO, as well as the International Monetary Fund (IMF). What Kling and 
Petri drew from these examples was the conclusion that statehood is decisive 
for international legal personality and, thus, the capacity to conclude 
international treaties. Forms of membership that do not entail any such 
treaty-making capacity did not seem relevant to Kling and Petri. Bernitz, 
however, shifts perspectives and emphasizes the opportunities, and not the 
limitations, that have been created by functional membership.133 Kling and 
Petri noted that accommodation without full membership had been granted 
mainly in expert organisations, and therefore they pointed to the difference 
between expert organisations and regional organisations like Norden. Bernitz 
does not disagree but argues that it should generally be easier to offer clearly 
delimited functional membership in regional organisations like Norden, where 
there is a broad sense of community among its members and a geographically 
limited number of potential members, as opposed to organisations with a 
global scope. Norden can hardly be described as an expert organisation; 
however, the Council of Ministers works within clearly delimited sectors and, 
it could thus be argued, has a functional orientation in practice.134 
Former General Secretary of the Council of Ministers Fridtjov Clement, who 
also contributed to the General Secretary’s report, spoke of full equality as 
only a marginal improvement in the autonomies’ position but at the same 
times found only minor problems with granting equality to the autonomies.135 
Clement offered no solution to the inherent international law implications 
but considered it fully feasible to grant the autonomies representation in the 
Presidium, for example. Clement also discussed whether majority decision-
making in the Council could be an option, considering that unanimity is hard 
to reach with eight rather than five members. Norden would then acquire a 
supranational character. Clement, however, excluded this possibility as in his 
opinion a state cannot be associated with more than one supranational 
organisation, a monopoly that in the Nordic context is filled by the European 
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Union. In general, he found it unlikely that the High Contracting Parties would 
accept to divert from the principle of unanimity at the same time as granting 
the autonomies full decision-making powers.136 Clement was also skeptical as 
to the autonomies’ practical capabilities to engage to a yet higher degree in 
Nordic co-operation. However, he deemed it possible to adjust the practical 
implications of Presidency in both, the Council and Council of Ministers, so as 
to be manageable also for the autonomies. Clement proposed a thorough 
review of the Helsinki Treaty to adjust the terminology in order to increase 
the autonomies’ influence and visibility. Clement further proposed to transfer 
the solution found within the Nordic Council in respect of the work in the 
committees to the Council of Ministers, namely allowing for the autonomies’ 
representatives to replace the Danish or Finnish representative in the 
decision-making process. In addition, Clement proposed to grant 
representatives for the autonomies the possibility to represent the Council of 
Ministers in meetings with the Nordic Council, its committees, the Association 
Norden (a pan-Nordic civil society organisation) or other actors.  
One important aspect that has been clarified following the General 
Secretary’s report is a contradiction between the Helsinki Treaty and the 
Council’s rules of procedure concerning the right to submit recommendations 
and questions to governments.137 The Helsinki Treaty, which of course is of a 
higher legal status and thus has precedence, speaks of ‘governments’ when it 
intends to address the governments of the Nordic countries and addresses the 
Home Rule Governments of the Faeroe Islands and Greenland and the 
Regional Government of Åland explicitly where these are included among a 
provisions’ addressees. This is not the case with regard to Article 57 of the 
Helsinki Treaty, which speaks about the right of each elected member to 
submit a question to a government. Thus, following a narrow interpretation 
of this provision, recommendations or questions may not be submitted to 
autonomies’ governments and they thus have no corresponding right to 
respond. However, the rules of procedure specifying Art. 57 include the Home 
Rule and Regional Governments among the circle of addressees.138 The 
working group looked closer at the issue and found that the preparatory works 
do not set any light on the issue. It noted, however, that it is custom to pose 
oral questions to the governments of the autonomies during the ordinary 
sessions of the Nordic Council, whenever their competences are concerned, 
and that neither Denmark nor Finland has voiced any objections to this 
practice.139 The working group concluded that the Helsinki Treaty is 
interpreted to include the autonomies as addressees without proposing 
 
 
136  Ibid. 39.  
137  Nordiska ministerrådet, De självstyrda områdena och det nordiska samarbetet. 
Generalsekreterarens kartläggning, ANP 2006:743, Copenhagen, 2006, 20. 
138  Cf. §58 Rules of Procedure of the Nordic Council. 
139  Nordiska Ministerrådet, Betänkande från arbetsgruppen med uppgift att föreslå initiativ som kan 
förstärka de självstyrda områdenas deltagande i nordiskt samarbete, Åland, 5 September 2007, para 
4.3. 
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further action on this matter.140 This interpretation has also been 
acknowledged formally by the Council.141 
The working group finally proposed practical remedies to increase the 
autonomies’ visibility, which did not necessitate amendments of the legal 
framework. It was suggested that the ministers and government official from 
the self-governing territories should be granted the right to lead the work of 
the committees of senior officials or of working groups during the presidency 
of its respective Member State, without any effects on voting rights.142 
Another suggestion was that the Nordic institutions and co-operative bodies 
be called upon to establish contacts with the autonomies and to reserve 
space to issues concerning the autonomies during their annual meetings. The 
working group also encouraged the autonomies to apply for membership of 
the boards, an already existing possibility that had not been fully 
exploited.143  
Nordic institutions and programmes are, in fact, not unimportant platforms 
for the autonomies to gain more visibility and stand side by side with the 
Member States in a range of activities, for example, in nominating candidates 
for the Nordic Price in Literature.144 However, it is partly due to the fact that 
the recommendations put forth in the Åland document had not been 
implemented and followed up by the Council of Ministers to the degree 
desired that the Faroes, Greenland and Åland signed the memorandum of co-
operation in 2007.145 
 
6. Conclusions 
While the legal framework for the autonomies’ co-operation within Norden 
has remained unchanged since 1983, more recent efforts to develop the 
structures for accommodation have focused on the implementation and 
engagement of the autonomies on the day to day level, within sub-
programmes. What is clearly visible from the latest official review of their 
 
 
140  Ibid. para. 4.3.3. See also Fridtjov Clement, Helsingforsavtalen og de selvstyrte områdene, Bilaga 3, 
Nordiska ministerrådet, De självstyrda områdena och det nordiska samarbetet. 
Generalsekreterarens kartläggning, ANP 2006:743, Copenhagen, 2006, 39. 
141  Nordiska rådet, Yttrande om Nordiska ministerrådets initiativ som kan förstärka de självstyrda 
områdenas deltagande i officiellt nordiskt samarbete, dokument 23, Nordiska rådets 
plenarförsamling 1 november 2007. 
142  Nordiska Ministerrådet, Betänkande från arbetsgruppen med uppgift att föreslå initiativ som kan 
förstärka de självstyrda områdenas deltagande i nordiskt samarbete, Åland, 5 September 2007, para 
4.2. 
143  Ibid. para 3.4; see also section 2.3 above. 
144 See webpage of Norden, Nominations for the Nordic Council Literature Prize 2013, at 
http://www.norden.org/da/aktuelt/nyheder/de-nominerede-til-nordisk-raads-litteraturpris-2013, 
last visited 6 October 2013. 
145  See webpage of the Government of Åland, Ålands landsksapregeringen, Lantrådet undertecknade 
för närmare samarbete, at  
 http://www.regeringen.ax/kansli/index.pbs?press%5Bid%5D=1371&press%5Bn%5D=8&press%5Binstan
ce%5D=118, last visited 22 October 2013.  
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status is that there is a high level of engagement, not only by the autonomies 
but also by the Nordic Council and the Nordic Council of Ministers. Certainly, 
the autonomies, and to a large extent also Denmark, have played the most 
proactive roles in initiating the processes outlined above. Nonetheless, the 
Nordic Council and the Nordic Council of Ministers have shown the willingness 
and capacity to react and adapt the institutional framework and practices, 
although denying accession and full membership. The modalities for 
accommodation have been discussed with an increasing level of detail, in 
deliberative processes including the autonomies themselves. Norden has 
shown that it in fact has the willingness and capacity to deal with the issue of 
autonomy accommodation and, most importantly, to adapt its institutional 
framework to allow for representation (with respect to the Nordic Council) 
and participatory structures (with respect to the Nordic Council of Ministers).  
In essence, all elected delegates on the Nordic Council have equal status; 
they are entitled to hold any office, whether they have been elected by a 
regional or a national parliament. They hold full voting capacity in the 
Plenary and the committees they are part of, irrespective of the legislative 
competences of their ‘home’ parliaments. In order to prevent exclusion, 
access to the committees and participation in their work is guaranteed even 
when these lack elected delegates from the autonomies.146 Although the 
autonomies as such have no guaranteed place in the Council’s Presidium and 
are not included in the rotation of the Presidency, they are not prevented 
from holding these high-profile offices. In fact, an elected member from 
Åland held the Presidency for Finland in 1997.147  About his experience as the 
President of the Nordic Council Olof Salmén has said that Åland was well 
accepted, in his words “almost alike the Nordic great powers”.148 His 
statement suggests that he did not feel forced to discard his Ålandic identity 
when filling the Finnish seat.  
The General Secretary of the Nordic Council has emphasised that the 
autonomies are able to participate in practically all contexts of Nordic co-
operation, the Council of Ministers included, and that they make good use of 
these opportunities. In ministerial-level meetings between 2002 and 2004, the 
Faroes participated in 47, Greenland in 34 and Åland in 55 out of a total of 89 
meetings. These numbers are rather remarkable considering the small sizes of 
the autonomy administrations, with generally fewer ministers, especially in 
comparison to the Nordic countries. Denmark, for instance, ranks lower than 
Åland and the Faroes at having participated in 46 meetings only.149 With 
regard to the Nordic Council of Ministers, the autonomies are neither 
 
 
146  Cf. §§ 23 and 33 Rules of Procedure of the Nordic Council. 
147 See webpage of Norden, Former Presidents of the Nordic Council, at 
http://www.norden.org/en/nordic-council/organisation-and-structure/nordic-council-
president/former-presidents-of-the-nordic-council, last visited 24 September 2014. 
148  Hasse Svensson, Åland från insidan. 25 röster om självstyrelse 1972-1997 (Ålands lagting, 
Mariehamn, 1997), 141, author’s translation. 
149  Nordiska ministerrådet, De självstyrda områdena och det nordiska samarbetet. 
Generalsekreterarens kartläggning, ANP 2006:743, Copenhagen, 2006, 23. 
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members nor mere observers but participants. They have been given 
institutional access to influence and shape decisions, which are not per se 
binding on the autonomies, but to which they may later accede. They can of 
course also exert influence on their national governments within the fora 
provided for internally and by virtue of national legislation. It has been noted 
that today the autonomies indeed participate in shaping the national 
programmes during their respective countries’ presidencies.150 In fact, the 
Nordic Council’s General Secretary describes the system of accommodation 
found for the Nordic autonomies in Norden as one of the broadest to be 
found.151 Nonetheless, it seems that there is space for yet more extended 
forms of co-operation even without full membership. As former General 
Secretary Clement proposed for instance, member states could explicitly be 
provided with the possibility of leaving their vote in the Council of Ministers 
to an autonomy, at their own discretion. The current legal framework does 
not prevent such arrangements. However, what can be drawn from the 
processes outlined above is that the member states jumped into action first 
when the legal framework explicitly provided for autonomy accommodation 
and then after the scope and limits of the alternatives had been carefully 
analysed. In this respect, legislation might not always be strictly necessary 
but of course it is both a guarantee for the autonomies and the member 
states that all abide by the same rules. 
While the scope for participation and indeed representation of the 
autonomies in the institutional framework for Nordic co-operation is broad, 
the limits of accommodation will always remain tied to the domestic 
frameworks, i.e., the internal delimitation of competences between the 
centre and the autonomy. The degree of sovereignty exercised by the Nordic 
autonomies and their capacity to conduct international affairs is determined 
internally. Denmark has concluded agreements with both the Faroe Islands 
and Greenland and provided their governments with the power to conclude 
certain international agreements on behalf of the Kingdom of Denmark.152 
However, corresponding powers, have not been transferred to the Åland 
Islands.153 Nordic co-operation itself is of course based on an international 
treaty between states, the Helsinki Treaty, and each binding decision of the 
Nordic Council of Ministers and the agreements concluded with third parties 
require corresponding treaty-making powers. However, the crux for Norden is 
not so much the domestic arrangements as such but rather concerns about 
practicality and feasibility. Considering Norden’s broad areas of co-operation 
 
 
150 Clement, Helsingforsavtalen og de selvstyrte områdene, Bilaga 3, Nordiska ministerrådet, De 
självstyrda områdena och det nordiska samarbetet. Generalsekreterarens kartläggning, ANP 
2006:743, Copenhagen, 2006, 40.  
151  Nordiska ministerrådet, De självstyrda områdena och det nordiska samarbetet. 
Generalsekreterarens kartläggning, ANP 2006:743, Copenhagen, 2006, 25.  
152  See Act no. 577 of 24June 2005 “Concerning the conclusion of agreements under international law 
by the Government of Greenland” and Act no. 579 of 24June 2005 “Concerning the conclusion of 
agreements under international law by the Government of the Faroes”. 
153  Cf. Section 58 Act on the Autonomy of Åland. 
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and the complexities of each autonomy arrangement, a case-by-case 
assessment of whether an autonomy, and which autonomy, may conclude an 
international agreement would require a far-reaching and resource-intensive 
extension of Norden’s mandate. The power to interpret the autonomy 
legislation in light of the Helsinki Treaty has not been transferred to any 
organ of Nordic co-operation. Norden does not maintain its own justice 
system to review such decisions in case of conflict, or any other conflict-
resolution body for that matter. 
International organisations, once determined to offer accommodation to 
sub-state entities, will have to carve their own institutional solutions for 
hosting entities with different degrees of sovereignty. Depending on the 
mandate and resources of each international organisation, these differences 
might be more or less decisive, so that in some contexts no more than 
observer status can be offered, while in others decision-making may be 
opened up for sub-state actors. It should be added here that the parliaments 
of the indigenous Saami in Finland, Norway and Sweden have observer status 
with speaking rights during the general debates in the Plenary of the Council 
or as otherwise determined by the Presidium.154 The Nordic Council has thus 
found different ways of accommodating different types of entities. Both 
states and international organisations are gate-keepers in this context, or 
more positively formulated, doors-openers. After all, international 
organisations cannot simply be considered as the sum of their member states, 
but are catalysts for change in their own right.  
Stakeholders often fail to understand that autonomy is always also a 
relational arrangement and very little work is done by constitutional and 
international lawyers to find appropriate ways for translating the powers of 
sub-state entities into the institutional structures of international 
organisations.155 In cases where autonomies are vested with constitutionally 
protected legislative powers, as is the case for the three Nordic autonomy 
regimes, the challenges of multi-level governance might not be possible to 
resolve entirely within domestic frameworks without an erosion of 
autonomous competences to the national level. The three dimensions that 
framed the question of autonomy accommodation in Norden, (1) the quality 
of the autonomy regime in question, (2) the international law implications 
and (3) the legal and practical modalities, i.e., the institutional demands, are 
relevant also in, for instance, the EU and future scenarios. It is thus all the 
more important to understand existing arrangements which might gain 
exemplary force if better understood. There is potential for further research, 
for example on the question of how far the degree of representation and 
participation awarded to autonomy regimes in different international 
frameworks reflects or matches the degree of their autonomy.  
 
 
154  § 13 Rules of Procedure of the Nordic Council. 
155  Sia Spiliopoulou Åkermark, “Internal Self-Determination and the Role of Territorial Autonomy as a 
Tool for the Resolution of Ethno-Political Disputes”, 20 International Journal on Minority and Group 
Rights (2013), 5–25, at 25. 
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Nordic co-operation has gained new impetus in recent years and it remains 
to be seen whether this will also necessitate changes with regard to the 
autonomies’ position. Thus far, co-operation in defence and security policy 
between the Nordic countries has largely taken place outside the Nordic 
Council of Ministers, but of course it is the same member states that have 
signed a declaration of solidarity and co-operation in matters of security and 
defence policy and loosely co-operate in the framework of the Nordic 
Defence Co-operation (NOREDFCO).156 The Nordic Council and Council of 
Ministers follow these developments closely. Being not only autonomous but 
also demilitarised and neutralised, defence and security co-operation is of 
concern to the Åland Islands, albeit it is not among their constitutionally 
protected competences, and it remains to be seen how this issue will be dealt 
with. 
Increased co-operation is not only discussed with regards to defence and 
security policy. The proposal of Swedish historian Gunnar Wetterberg to 
create a Nordic federation has attracted considerable attention, also within 
the Nordic Council and motivated others to discuss the possibilities for 
creating yet closer political ties between the Nordic countries.157 Wetterberg 
himself does not dwell upon the position of the autonomies within a potential 
federation but he does not fail to note that this is one of the most important 
aspects of any negotiations about a future federation.158 Thus far, the Nordic 
autonomies, the Nordic countries and the Nordic Council of Ministers (and 
possibly the Nordic Council) cannot be described as competing levels of 
governance, they are complementary at best. Norden is a platform for co-
operation. Federal or supranational decision-making is a different matter and 
poses different demands on representation and democratic participation that 
are more complex to solve. After almost 20 years and after the adaptation of 
the national constitutional, as well as local legislative frameworks, Åland’s EU 
membership is still experienced as problematic due to a lack of 
representation and genuine participation in decision-making processes at the 
European level.159 All that we know now is that Nordic co-operation has 
 
 
156  For more information on Nordefco, visit its webpage at http://www.nordefco.org/The-basics-about-
NORDEFCO, last visited 7 October 2013. See also Thorvald Stoltenberg, Nordeisk samarbeid om 
utenriks- og sikkerheitspolitikk, Forslag overlevert de nordiske utenriksministere på ekstraordinært 
nordisk utenriksministermøte, Oslo, 9 February 2009, available on the webpage of the Government 
of Norway at http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/UD/Vedlegg/nordiskrapport.pdf, last accessed 20 
October 2013. 
157  See Wetterberg, A United Nordic Federation…; Strang, Nordiska Gemenskaper... 
158  Wetterberg, A United Nordic Federation…, 30–31.  
159  See Markku Suksi, “Sub-National Issues: Local Government Reform, Re-Districting of Administrative 
Jurisdiction, and the Åland Islands in the European Union,” 13(3) European Public Law (2007), 379–
406 at 390 et seqq; Niilo Jääskinen, “The Case of the Åland Islands – Regional Autonomy versus the 
European Union of States”, in Stephan Weatherill and Ulf Bernitz (eds.), The Role of Regions and 
Sub-National Actors in Europe. Essays in European Law (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2005), 89-101; 
Sören Silverström, “Implementation of EU Legislation on the Åland Islands”, in Sia Spiliopoulou 
Åkermark (ed.), “Constitutions, Autonomies and the EU”, 2 Report from the Åland Islands Peace 
Institute (2008), 42–50, available online at  
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proven adaptable also in light of major structural changes and that the spirit 
of co-operation has also meant an accommodating attitude toward the 
autonomies, which can be expected to be decisive also for future solutions 
and should not be disregarded as an example for others. The autonomy 
regimes of all three Nordic autonomies have developed considerably since the 
early days of Nordic co-operation and will continue to do so, which also 
suggests that Norden needs to continue an adaptable approach and engage in 
order to re-negotiate the best alternatives for accommodation. At this point, 
any development towards a federal or supranational arrangement seems 
distant. What we are left with to date is a diverse picture that speaks of 
representation, participation, and institutional accommodation beyond the 
traditional conventions of ‘all in’ or ‘all out’. 
 
 
 http://www.peace.ax/images/stories/pdf/autonomiwebb.pdf, last accessed 21 October 2013; 
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http://www.norden.org/en/nordic-council-of-ministers/international-co-operation. 
The History of the Nordic Council, at http://www.norden.org/en/nordic-council/the-nordic-
council/the-history-of-the-nordic-council.  
Nordiska rådets partigrupper, at http://www.norden.org/sv/om-samarbetet/organisationer-
og-institutioner/nordiska-raadets-partigrupper. 
Nordic Council of Ministers, Institutions and Other Co-operation Organisations, at 
http://www.norden.org/en/nordic-council-of-ministers/institutions-and-other-co-operation-
organisations. 
Nominations for the Nordic Council Literature Prize 2013, at 
http://www.norden.org/da/aktuelt/nyheder/de-nominerede-til-nordisk-raads-litteraturpris-
2013. 
NORDEFCO 
The basic facts about NORDEFCO, http://www.nordefco.org/The-basics-about-NORDEFCO. 
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